Ḥeleḳ Rishon, kerekh 1. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot ṿe-tsoraf la-hen Sefer Minḥat ḳenaʼot le-R. Aba Mari de-Lunil [Haḳdamah-pereḳ 37] -- Ḥeleḳ Rishon, kerekh 2. Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Miḳra Midrash ṿe-deʻot ṿe-tsoraf la-hen Sefer Minḥat ḳenaʼot le-R. Aba Mari de-Lunil [pereḳ 38-pereḳ 127] -- Ḥeleḳ sheni. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Masekhet Berakhot ṿe-Seder Zeraʻim -- Ḥeleḳ shelishi. Teshuvot ha-shayakhot le-Masekhet Shabat ṿe-ʻEruvin.

Al-Fārābī's lost commentary on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea is without doubt one of the most sorely missed lost works of the Islamic falāsifa. In part, this is because the commentary was in some respects a scandal, and scholars accordingly believe it may hold the key to resolving present-day disagreements on how to interpret al-Fārābī's views as expressed in his independent treatises. Perhaps al-Fārābī's most shocking or scandalous statement is that preserved by the Hispano-Muslim philosophers Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl, and Ibn (...) Rushd. According to them al-Fārābī says in his commentary on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea that happiness is to be achieved only in this life, not in the afterlife; that there is no happiness but political happiness; and that union with the active intellect – generally considered the highest goal of human existence by the philosophers – is impossible. This paper addresses the following questions: What exactly is the debate about? Why is the question of immortality or conjunction related to Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea? And why was it so controversial to say, in the context of the Ethica Nicomachea, that there is no happiness but political happiness? Although the bulk of al-Fārābī's commentary is still lost, I have discovered two quotations of it in Hebrew manuscripts. As I will argue in this paper, these newly-discovered quotations – which are included with an English translation in the appendix – can shed light on the mysteries concerning al-Fārābī's commentary. Résumé Le commentaire perdu d'al-Fārābī à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque d'Aristote est sans conteste, parmi les ouvrages perdus de philosophes islamiques, l'un de ceux dont on regrette le plus l'absence. Cela s'explique notamment par le caractère à certains égards scandaleux de ce commentaire, dont les spécialistes attendent dès lors qu'il recèle la clé pour résoudre les désaccords actuels quant à l'interprétation à donner aux idées formulées par cet auteur dans ses traités personnels. La thèse peut-être la plus choquante ou scandaleuse d'al-Fārābī est celle qui est préservée par les philosophes hispano-islamiques Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl et Ibn Rushd: selon eux, il affirme, dans son commentaire à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque, que le bonheur ne saurait se réaliser qu'en cette vie et non dans l'au-delà, qu'il n'y a pas de bonheur autre que le bonheur politique, et que l'union à l'intellect agent – généralement tenue par les philosophes pour être la fin suprême de l'existence humaine – est impossible. Cet article traite les questions suivantes: quel est exactement l'enjeu de ce débat? Pourquoi les questions de l'immortalité et de la conjonction sont-elles liées à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque? Et en quoi était-il si problématique d'affirmer, en référence à cette œuvre, qu'il n'y a pas de bonheur autre que le bonheur politique? Même si le corps du commentaire d'al-Fārābī est encore perdu, j'en ai découvert deux citations dans des manuscrits hébreux. Comme je le soutiens ici, ces citations récemment découvertes – données dans l'appendice avec leur traduction anglaise – font un peu de lumière sur les mystères du commentaire d'al-Fārābī. (shrink)

Proposes an innovative rethinking of Aristotle’s work as a system that integrates his theology with his doctrine of reproduction and life. In this deep rethinking of Aristotle’s work, Abraham P. Bos argues that scholarship on Aristotle’s philosophy has erred since antiquity in denying the connection between his theology and his doctrine of reproduction and life in the earthly sphere. Beginning with an analysis of God’s role in the Aristotelian system, Bos explores how this relates to other (...) elements of his philosophy, especially to his theory of reproduction. The argument he develops is that in talking about the cosmos, Aristotle rejected Plato’s metaphor of artisanal production by a divine Demiurge in favor of a biotic metaphor based on the transmission of life in reproduction, in which pneuma—not breath as it is often interpreted but the life-bearing spirit in animals and plants—plays a key and sustaining role as the vital principle in all that lives. In making this case, he defends the authenticity of the treatises De Mundo and De Spiritu as Aristotle’s, and demonstrates Aristotle’s works as a unified system that sharply and comprehensively refutes Plato’s, and in particular replaces Plato’s doctrine of the soul with a theory in which the soul is clearly distinguished from the intellect. “Bos offers a fresh, interesting, and important perspective. His interpretation will be very controversial, but if he is right, the standard Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotle will have to change radically.” — Malcolm Wilson, author of Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica: A More Disorderly Nature. (shrink)

The psychology of Aristotle has never been understood in a historically correct way. A new interpretation of the De anima will be proposed in which this work can be seen as compatible with the psychology that can be reconstructed from the fragments of Aristotle's lost dialogues and the De motu animalium and other biological works and the doxographical data gathered from ancient writers besides the commentators. In De anima, II, 412b5, where psychè is defined as 'the first entelecheia (...) of a natural body that is organikon,' the words 'natural body' should not be taken to mean 'the body of a living plant, animal or human being' but to stand for 'elementary body.' And the qualification 'organikon' should not be understood as 'equipped with organs' but in the sense of 'serving as an instrument to the soul.' This 'instrumental body' that is inseparably connected with the soul is the seat of desire, which physically influences the parts of the visible body. Besides those two corrections there are the words ta merè in 412b18 that should be taken as meaning not 'parts of the body' but 'parts of the soul.' Aristotle is arguing there that even those parts of the soul that are not yet actualized in the embryo of a new living being can be said to be 'not without body.'. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the heart of Aristotle’s philosophy was his doctrine of pneuma, which connected his psychology, biology, cosmology and theology, and which was central to his (lost and extant) works and should be taken into account, even where it is less explicitly discussed. Pneuma is not a sixth elementary physical body. It is the manifestation of the divine ether but always mixed with the other four elements within the sublunary sphere.

Why do all animals possess sense perception while plants don’t? And should the difference in quality of life between human beings and wolves be explained by supposing that wolves have degenerated souls? This paper argues that for Aristotle differences in quality of life among living beings are based on differences in the quality of their soul-principle together with the body that receives the soul. The paper proposes a new interpretation of On the Soul 2.4.415b18: “For all the natural bodies (...) are instruments of the soul,” against all current interpretations. Aristotle there means that each of the four sublunary elements can be a part of the instrumental body of a soul. The paper continues with discussing the way in which Aristotle connects the several sublunar elements with different levels of life activity, and the troublesome passage in Generation of Animals 3.11.761b22, where Aristotle speaks about a fourth category of living creatures related to the fourth sublunary element, Fire, and the region of the Moon. (shrink)

Trabajando sobre el género de ¿Historias de los Profetas¿ (Qis.as. al-Anbiya-¿) en el proceso de elaboración de mi tesis sobre Abraham en la literatura islámica, el profesor J. Sadan me envió un manuscrito que había localizado en la British Library relacionado con este género. Posteriormente encontré versiones similares de la misma composición, lo que me animó a profundizar mi investigación sobre sus orígenes. La obra está próxima a la literatura de predicación (wa¿z.), que se ocupa principalmente de la educación (...) moral, pero también incluye historias. Me planteé la posibilidad de que éste formarse un género que hubiera surgido como una ayuda, un material auxiliar concebido para entender la tradición oral y los estudios religiosos para, posteriormente, convertirse en un género independiente, más cercano a la Parénesis o al Specula Regis (Espejos de príncipes). Describiré el manuscrito para intentar alcanzar una conclusión sobre ciertas cuestiones: ¿es éste un género literario diferente?, ¿se trata de un género educativo o solamente es una versión simplificada de historias para ilustrar a niños o principiantes de la lengua árabe?, ¿buscaría el autor un nombre original para su compilación, haciendo referencia al reducido tamaño de la colección y descartando el de Qis.as. al-Anbiya-¿ por ser conocido? (shrink)

What explains people's propensity to ask existential questions that they have little hope of resolving, such as: Why are we here? What, if any, is our purpose? What is the structure of the universe? That humans engage in these endeavors has long puzzled evolutionary theorists, as they go beyond the immediate demands of fending for ourselves, seeking safety, finding food, and reproducing, which occupy the daily lives of other animals. In this book, philosopher Helen De Cruz draws on a wide (...) range of disciplines and thinkers, from Aristotle and 12th-century Muslim philosopher Ibn Tufayl to Jewish thinker Abraham Heschel and science writer Rachel Carson, showing how awe and wonder lie at the heart of such existential questions. She argues that there is an emotional basis to this drive for inquiry, as wonder and awe are epistemic emotions that help us think about big-picture questions and that motivate the answers we provide to those questions. (shrink)

The Exalted Fath: Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah Transleted by Solomon Ibn Lavi, Ha-Emunah ha-Nissaʼah Transleted by Samuel Ibn Matut, The Anonymous Commentary to HaEmunah ha-Ramah.

This paper will argue that the order and the unity of St. Thomas Aquinas’s five ways can be elucidated through a consideration of St. Thomas’s appropriation of an Avicennian insight that he used to order and unify the wisdom of the Aristotelian and Abrahamic philosophical traditions towards the existence of God. I will begin with a central aporia from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle says that the science of first philosophy has three different theoretical vectors: ontology, aitiology, and theology. But (...) how can all three be united into a single Aristotelian science? In his Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna resolved the impasse by taking the ontological vector as the subject of metaphysics. He then integrated the question of the four first causes into the penultimate stage of his demonstration for the existence of God, thereby placing aitiological and theological questions among the ultimate concerns of a unified Aristotelian metaphysics. In the five ways, St. Thomas integrated Avicenna’s Aristotelian search for the first four causes into the last four of his five ways, by showing that each of the four aitiological orders terminate in an ultimate first cause that we call God. Finally, by appending the proof from the Physics to the beginning of the five ways, St. Thomas was able to show that the ultimate aim of both natural philosophy and metaphysics is the divine first principle, which is the beginning and subject of sacra doctrina. (shrink)

Emch, G.G., Liu, C.: The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg (2002) 11. Frigg, R., Werndl, C.: Entropy – a guide for the perplexed. Forthcoming in: Beisbart, C., Hartmann, S. (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford  ...

This article discusses neoplatonic and aristotelian presence in Ibn Gabirol metaphysics. With this aim, Plotinus and Gabirol’s are confronted in some of the main points, where the resemblance had already been pointed: the First Principle, the intermediary between God and the world and the universal matter. Once the differences between the approaches of these authors regarding such questions have been identified, some contributions which may come from the works of Aristotle will be briefly presented, in order to clarify the (...) origin of Gabirol’s ideas. We believe that Gabirol´s metaphysics must be understood in its historical-philosophical context, characterized by a view of Plato and Aristotle´s doctrines not as conflicting but complementary, as well as in its effort of harmonize them with the abrahamic creationism which, in this case, obeys the Judaic primacy of radical separation between God and the creation. KEY WORDS – Ibn Gabirol. Universal Hylemorfism. Aristotle. Substance. Intelligible Matter. (shrink)

ḥeleḳ 1. Mitsṿot 1-41 -- ḥeleḳ 2. Mitsṿot 42-114.